This is an important book by an important writer on an important theme. A well-known classicist, Paul Woodruff, Mary Helen Thompson Professor of the Humanities at the University of Texas in Austin, has given us a significant book of one notion in two cultures. To my knowledge, this is the only book on reverence we have today, and it is the only multicultural book by a classicist who dips into both Confucius and classical Greece. It is a first step in the right direction of world interculture, focused on the crucial notion of "reverence."


The book is good in many ways. It is lively, quite readable and down to earth, persuasive in arguing by stories for how essential reverence is to election, family, ecological awareness, neighborhood meeting, playing a game, military cohesion, music, funeral, etc. (chapter 2, 3). At times mumbling vaguely, the book is always relevant to today, always ready with colorful stories often from ancient Greece, to argue for reverence from human mortality (chapter 5). He uses the concrete word

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"bare" to explain "essence" or "universal" (chapter 4), reminiscent of C. S. Lewis' "mere" for the essence of Christianity. His explanation of "feeling" is also instructive, all over (6, 24, 30, 61-65, 66, 69, 70, 73f, 88, 104-107, 190, etc.), and is fitting for "reverence." Etc. The threefold contribution to reverence, that it is intercultural, that it is mutual, and that it is ubiquitous in life and history, is to Woodruff's credit.

That this book is significant and good does not mean it is perfect, however. It is one thing to relevantly rove around under a cohesive theme; it is quite another to ramble randomly in the uncertain terrain of reverence, voluptuously collecting stuff from the two world traditions, ancient Greece and ancient China; he simply collates them just to stress widespread impacts of reverence on life. Loose ends are everywhere in need of tying up. Let me do some in his-our spirit of mutual respect. I have four examples among many others: the superior respecting the inferior, relativism as inter-learning, religion as reverence, and the ubiquity of reverence.

ONE: The "superior" (teachers, rulers) must respect their inferior (students, people ruled), says Woodruff, and proposed its why in our being all human, teacher and ruler included, limited in perspective and in knowledge. This point is derived from the Greek idea of human limitations. I would add that the positive rationale for the superior respecting the inferior lies in respect-as-letting people freely develop, that is, for the superior to facilitate people's free growth into humanity. This rationale is shared by both Confucius and Chuang Tzu.

What about respect of the unworthy superior? Woodruff is dead-set against paying respect to the tyrants (5, 165), unaware of how Confucius turns reclusive in days of tyranny, and how Chuang Tzu (4/55-64) handles tyrants as handling killer tigers, by respecting their nature, until they come to fawn on us. This respectful handling of tyrants shows the ubiquity of reverence, in and out of season. See below.

TWO: I agree with Woodruff's critique of "relativism," "I am right, you are right, too," somewhat as a liar's paradox in dead-end, unable to affirm or deny its own position. He remains critical of such relativism as irrelevant to reverence; it is
hard to see then why this chapter is included in a book on reverence. I would add 
that a relativist can respect the opponents to learn from them, even from "abomina-
tions." 1 Woodruff says that "even the ancients were shocked" at "sex, violence, 
and conflict among the gods" (137); so what happened to Greek reverence to gods? 
In contrast, Freud used these immoral Greek divinities to elucidate our psychic 
"complexes." Ancient Christians were shocked at Baal's sexual worship and then, 
learning from Hosea (dead-set against it) who announced God to be the Husband of 
Israelites, saw Christ as Husband of the church. Shocked at Moloch's baby-sacrifice, 
the Christians then saw Christ's death as God sacrificing his own Son. Greek slav-
ery system was absorbed by Paul calling himself "Christ's slave," being proud that 
he is in as high a status as his Lord's "high family," and "slave to all," adopting the 
convention that the lord's authority derives from being enslaved to the people he 
lords over.2 In the meantime, slaves as human chattels are tacitly dissolved.

THREE: I agree that religion has three aspects, doctrinal, ritualistic, and insti-
tutional, that the core of religion is reverence, but then Woodruff went on to insist 
that reverence has nothing to do with religion, for some religions are not deserving 
of "religion." This move creates more problems than it solves, and must be related 
to his curious omission of Socrates' daimon, the uncanny Beyond whose voice was 
unconditionally obeyed; if this is not "religion" I don't know what it is. Being eager 
to stress the impact of reverence, Woodruff stresses reverence as means for social 
stability and forgets to go deep into what reverence is.

I on my part must cite Rudolf Otto's well-known characterization of our sense 
of the holy as mysterium (yielding to the Beyond, the other), tremendum (our self-
realization of mortality and limitations), et fascinans (ubiquitous impacts on all as-
pects of our life). That's religion at its primal core. Of the three, the first, our yield-

1 Chuang Tzu constantly learns from brigands as paradigms of sages (10/11-16, 23/76-77, 29/). 
"Child marriage" (155-158) can be channeled into schooling of young ladies in domestic economics 
and other subjects, perhaps in an engaged status, with the proviso that they could dissolve engage-
ment.
2 Dale B. Martin, Slavery as Salvation, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990. Do we hear Je-
sus here saying, "the leader [must become] like one who serves" (Luke 22:26)?
ing to the mysterium of the Beyond and the other is most important. Artur Schnabel said "music is better than it can be played," as Chuang Tzu said (2/43) perfect music "plays not." We don't play music, but let music play itself through us, as we don't grow kids, but facilitate their growth, nor teach students but allow them to teach themselves. We stay out of interfering with them, to be part of them. That's reverence.

FOUR: Some practices of reverence may not be worthy, but this fact does not justify restricting reverence by distinguishing it from respect; sometimes "honor" is a more appropriate word than "respect" but we must guard against proliferating synonyms. Reverence is critical-evaluative but this aspect should not be allowed to restrict its impacts, as the Western mind tends to, for evaluation does not prevent reverence from being ubiquitous. Chuang Tzu said (22/45) the Tao to be revered is in shards, piss and dung. All above examples elucidate this ubiquity of reverence in the spirit of which we inter-learn as we inter-correct, thus incorporating evaluation in respect. This is a radicalization of reverence to resolve Woodruff's "paradox of respect (197-203)," i.e., universal respect is no respect (ubiquity does not spell senselessness, as elucidated above), respect is solely to the deserving (yet the superior respect the inferior).

The ubiquity of reverence is best exemplified in Socrates, who sincerely-respectfully examines-evaluates everyone to realize (and let us all to realize) that we all should be at the level of not-pretending to know (Confucius agrees [2/17], "to admit the unknown as unknown is to know" ), and then learn together. The Dialogue of Euthyphro where Socrates explores piety with Euthyphro ends significantly, "Another time, Socrates!" , opening out to the future of co-learning. That's reverence before the mysterium of the Beyond. That's Socrates' pious obedience to the Delphic Oracle, to death, as he was accused of "impiety" (in the Apology).

Another concrete ubiquity is to honor one's elders, to care for one's youngsters, revering the past and respectfully nurturing the future to weave one's family, to reach people's elders and youngsters (Mencius 1A7), to spread the family of our
community toward the whole world the family of brotherhood within the Four Seas, which fulfills Plato's vision (200). Chuang Tzu (14/6) extends family-warmth even to tigers and wolves intimate among parents and cubs. Woodruff almost subscribes to this idea of universal family but stops short, claiming (205) that only those humans who are willing to practice home-ceremonies deserve to have "home." This stance cuts down on his reverence for the family. Not surprisingly, this last chapter has no China.

Tying up all above for Woodruff, I say we live by being with others beyond us, and reverence is our life-attitude to the Beyond, awe before the mysterium of the other as the other, inter-shocked (tremendum) to inter-learn (fascinans). Here is interculture among different ways of thinking and behaving. Loss of reverence results in ennui, cynicism, and absurdity. Thus Woodruff rightly stresses the indispensable role of reverence in our society, especially, against the utilitarian-­contractual view, to underscore reverence in politics the art of managing affairs of being with others. This practice of reverence is respect of past history the tradition, and respect of the future, as in Confucius' awe at later-comers (後生可畏) and respectfully ruling people-as-­children (子民).

I have some more to say than above, but enough has been said on this crucial point, that it is thus that I critically continue what Woodruff commenced, mutual intercultural respect in our shared reverence to the other. We see now that Woodruff's view of reverence as evaluative impact on life is due to his Western penchant. He does not take reverence as unconditional respect of the other as the other (Confucius enjoying waters and mountains, Chuang Tzu enjoying nature as it is, thing-­ing things 物物); he does not really learn from China but just cites its parallels (predominantly from Confucius) to his familiar Greek tradition. At the same time, China must also learn from what he cited from ancient Greece, viz., deep awareness of human limitations, warning against human hubris to play gods, and Socratic self-­examination and evaluation of what is to learn. All this, I believe, describes what Woodruff rightly stressed though perhaps practiced insufficiently, that mutual rever-
ence is essential to our survival. I continue to press that reverence is ubiquitous and mutual, cosmic and intercultural – to the core.
【書評】 Book Reviews

李零：《入山與出塞》
（北京：文物出版社，2004年）

李修平

一、前言

《入山與出塞》一書為北京大學中文系教授李零先生於二〇〇四年出版的論文選集，除了〈自序〉與〈後記〉外，全書共收錄了二十九篇文章，分為「寫在前面的話」、「翁仲研究」、「有翼神獸研究」、「早期藝術中的宇宙模式」、「早期藝術中的神物圖像」、「淅川楚墓研究」、「楚國銅器研究」與「讀書偶記」八大部分，探討的課題牽涉廣泛且豐富多元。文章內容多由考古遺物遺跡入手，結合歷史學、藝術史與古文獻學等研究取徑，重新審視中國上古史中，所謂「中國文化」或「華夏文化」形成與發展的軌跡。

李零的年輕時代，曾歷經文化大革命十年浩劫。當年的他僅受過中學教育，在狂潮漸歇之後，李零決定重拾書本，進入中國社科院考古系研究古文字學。身為一位考古學系的學生，他曾經兩度親下田野，參與考古遺址的挖掘。但應是醉心古文字學的魅力，他還是決定將對學術的熱情，投注於古文獻學的研究，放棄了與「土」打交道的考古學。雖然古文字學與古文獻學是他的專門研究領域，但考古學的背景與訓練，始終在李零的學術研究中扮演重要的角色。大量使用考古材料並結合各種不同學門的研究方式，便成爲他治學的特點。《入山與出塞》就是這樣的一本論文選集。

二、尋幽探密：簡介《入山與出塞》

（一）入山與出塞

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本書名為《入山與出塞》，開宗明義即表明作者欲從「入山」與「出塞」兩個角度出發，解釋中國上古文明演變的特色。在全書首篇〈入山與出塞〉一文中，作者大略敘述他近來關注的兩個研究課題：中國古代的祭祀遺址，以及考古發現的外來影響（頁3、10）。前者（入山）強調中國在上古時代，早已發展出自身獨樹一格的文明特色；後者（出塞）則論述遠古時期中外（華夏與蠻夷、中原與境外、東方與西方）交通與相互影響的關係。研究方式則是考察出土文物的型制與藝術表現的手法，從中尋繹外來文化對「古代中國」文化的影響。

中國現代的考古學肇興於二十世紀初年。隨著各地考古遺址的發現，大量的先民遺物於焉重現天日，為中國的史學界帶來空前的震撼。但由於技術與觀念的不成熟，早期的考古發掘，一方面著重於古代城邑與相關的聚落，忽略位於名山大川的「祭祀」遺址，另一方面則注重發掘出來的「物」，而非保存器物的「坑」（或遺址）（頁3）。這樣的現象，導致研究者對於遺物遺跡誤判，無法真正看清古代中國文化的面貌。《左傳•成公十三年》：
「國之大事，在祀與戎」，短短的八個字，直截明瞭地指出了祭祀與戰爭在古代中國的重要地位，然而囿於後人之見，學者往往多研究古代的戰爭史，關於古代宗教與祭祀活動著墨不多，這是值得檢討並進行深入研究的課題。
〈說「祭壇」和「祭祀坑」〉便是針對中國古代的祭祀遺址，進行初步綜合性的討論與相關概念的釐清。一方面，作者整理傳統文獻中關於「祭壇」及「祭祀坑」的記載，從文獻中考證祭祀活動的場域名稱與功能，另外，李零還收集「祭壇」及「祭祀坑」的考古報告，配合文獻資料，解釋「祭壇」即古書中的「壇」、「墠」或「場」（頁17-20）；「祭祀坑」即古書中的「瘞坎」，其中埋藏的物品具備特殊的宗教目的。結合出土文物與文獻資料，李零嘗試為古代中國的祭祀活動，勾勒出一幅帶有文化意義的歷史圖像。

除了對祭祀遺址進行考察外，本書著重的另一個焦點則是考古文物中潛藏的外來影響。隨著中國「邊緣地區」考古文物的出土，以及對古代北亞草原文化的研究，再加上對遠古時代其他文明特色的比較，綜合觀之，這些不

1 關於「壇」、「墠」及「場」三字，雖然都帶有舉辦祭祀活動場域的意思，亦經常穿插使用，但其中仍有不同的意義。