The Place of China in the Construction of
Japan’s Early Modern World View

By Peter Nosco
University of British Columbia

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Let us begin by asking what makes a world view early modern? Like its better-known
younger sibling, early modernity represents contested terrain, and just like the concepts of
modernity and modernization, early modernity requires special care if one is to avoid, as
Benedict Anderson has phrased it, “the conceit that everything important in the modern
world originated in Europe.”¹ Indeed, just as it is now evident that there is no single
model for modernity, it is likewise clear that there can be no single model for early
modernity, making it appropriate to speak in terms of multiple (early) modernities.

This understanding of “multiple modernities” informed Shmuel Eisenstadt and
Wolfgang Schlacter when they sought a few years ago to articulate an understanding of
early modernity for a special issue of Daedalus. Their definition—rooted in Europe but
with broader relevance and applicability—provides a helpful point of departure for our
own inquiry. In Eisenstadt and Schlacter’s terms, “In the European context, early

modernity refers to the period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, when territorial states became major vehicles for resource mobilization and for the construction of collective identities.” Resource mobilization is linked to the subsequent formation of nation-states and represents early modernity’s political-institutional dimension, while the construction of collective identity is similarly linked to the construction of “imagined communities,” to use Anderson’s felicitous term, and is in varying ways constituted by the social and cultural.

In this paper we will principally concern ourselves with the place of China in the world view of Japan during the early modern Edo or Tokugawa period (1600-1867), and we shall look for this world view within the collective identity that emerges at that time, including the new understanding of *Japanese*ness fashioned during the eighteenth century. This world view represented an overarching perspective from which a broad range of persons across classes in Japan viewed both the macrocosm of the world beyond as well as the microcosm of one’s own immediate world. As such this world view had both spatial and temporal dimensions, since it constitutes a specific orientation, a way of locating oneself within increasingly complex terrain, and as we shall see, China figured

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3 In fact, the link between early modernity and collective identity is so strong, that just as one can posit early modernity in terms of what individuals share—such as a history, a language, a cultural heritage, a spatial orientation, and an identity—one can similarly posit post-modernity as linked with individual difference, i.e., with the recognition of the important capacity of individual persons and groups to find their place in complex and diverse society, notwithstanding their own distinctiveness. See, for example, Seyla Benhabib’s *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1996).
prominently in both dimensions. Further, as a distinct perspective, this world view included dynamic epistemological assumptions which similarly heralded a modernity which in the minds of some never arrived in Japan, and again we shall see China playing a prominent role in this transformation as well.

Construction of a heritage—temporal orientation

In his influential study of the same title, Eric Hobsbawm has written how the “invention of tradition” involves the construction of a set of practices “which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior through repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past,” and he has argued the relevance of such invented traditions to “that comparatively recent historical innovation, the ‘nation,’ with its associated phenomena: nationalism, the nation-state, national symbols, histories and the rest.”

Scholars of modern Japan, in turn, have applied Hobsbawm’s concept to modern Japan with considerable success, disclosing the “recent origins of ‘age-old’ Japanese traditions,” which in Stephen Vlastos’ words, when examined historically, “turn out to be modern.” However, Vlastos is mistaken when he writes that “a sense of ‘being Japanese’ developed after, rather than before, the building of the modern state,” and fundamental to the emergence of this collective identity was not the invention of tradition, but rather the construction of a temporal orientation that included a fictive

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6 Ibid., p. 11.
heritage.

It was during the eighteenth century that several scholars, but most prominently Kamo no Mabuchi (1697-1769) and Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801), first, used their linguistic analysis of Japan’s most ancient extant texts to “glean” from those texts what they asserted to be an ancient Japanese Way (kodô), and second, transformed their quest into something akin to a contemporary religion. Elsewhere, I have described the imaginary past created by these nativists as a nostalgic exercise whereby they sought wholeness and meaning through their otherwise “escapist” efforts, on the one hand to reenter, and on the other hand to resurrect a past that never was, and I have argued that the nostalgic fantasy by its very nature represents an inverse of its author’s dissatisfaction with and alienation from the present. In this sense, the nativists’ nostalgia was an expression of their own disenchantment. We return to Mabuchi and Norinaga later in this paper.

The placement of one’s idealized circumstances in a realm removed from the here-and-now temporally but not spatially represents just one option in the escapist fantasy. For example, if one were to argue that the present place and time represent the best of all possible worlds—as, for example, one finds represented in Ihara Saikaku’s observation in the 1690s that, “It is a mark of good fortune, indeed, that we live in such a prosperous age”—one is exhibiting what might be styled the “Pollyanna syndrome”.

(See the following Table.)

Table

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Present</th>
<th>This place (here)</th>
<th>That (remote) place</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Pollyanna”—The here-and-now is the best of all possible worlds</td>
<td>Homesickness, wanderlust, escapism—If only I were in some other place (Hawaii?), how</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(characteristic of much thought in my former home in southern California)</td>
<td>wonderful life would be!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past</td>
<td>Nostalgia—characteristic of much Asian thought, including the Japanese nativism of Kamo no Mabuchi and Motoori Norinaga</td>
<td>Garden of Eden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future</td>
<td>Utopianism, Marxism—characteristic of European and North American thought</td>
<td>Science fiction, and millennial thought (as in Revelation)</td>
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Idealized circumstances removed spatially but not temporally, as in the lament “If only I were in…,” are similarly indicative of either homesickness or wanderlust. It is, however, when the idealized circumstances are separated and removed by the passage of time that one finds the escapist exercise contributing to the construction of a temporal orientation. For example, it is common in much European and North American thought to locate one’s paradise in the future. When this placement is accompanied by spatial distancing, it finds representation in such genres as science fiction or apocalyptic/millennial writings such as Revelation. If one instead locates the future paradise in this very place—as Marxist and other utopian fantasies do—one is proposing a more secular form of redemption. Or, one might find one’s paradise in a realm which is remote both spatially and temporally (in the past), as can be seen in such constructions as the Garden of Eden. The positing of one’s idealized circumstances in an ancient realm—a world removed temporally but not spatially—is representative of much Asian thought in general, and Chinese thought in particular, and it recurs in the eighteenth-century Japanese nativist nostalgic fantasy, contributing to a temporal orientation which, like Japanese verbs,
included a present and a past, but not a changed future.

During the Tokugawa period, there was an explosion of interest in Japan’s past—more historical writing appears during the seventeenth century than in all of Japanese history prior to the seventeenth century—and most of this historical writing reflects two assumptions, both of which privilege continuity. The first, reflecting the Confucian inspiration for much of this historical writing, is that the present is linked to the past through the enduring activity of certain ineluctable principles, such as the fiction of Japan’s inviolate imperial succession. The second, reflecting the success of the early modern Tokugawa state in erasing its origins in violence, suggested that the way things are is the way that they will remain for “ten thousand generations,” that is to say, forever.9 One sees here a reflection of Ernest Renan’s oft-cited dictum that, “The essence of a nation is that all persons have many things in common, and that they have also forgotten many things.”10 And, it was in this sense that early modernity in Tokugawa Japan embraced a past and even a present, but that its understanding of time lacked a destiny or teleology.

At the same time, the nativists’ positing of a paradisiac condition in the remote past represented the construction of fictive social conditions with both horizontal and vertical aspects. By virtue of the nativist argument that the earthly paradise could be resurrected in the hear-and-now, it followed that persons in Japan might once again reestablish the same hierophany, i.e., a liana joining even ordinary Japanese vertically through the state to their emperor and then on to the deities (kami) of the Plain of High

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Heaven, and especially the solar deity Amaterasu, which spiritually animated and guided their forebears in the archaic past. This argument also repressed politics and political action by representing the status quo as an ineluctable expression of divine will.

By contrast horizontally, the nativists argued that all Japanese—and only Japanese—possessed “true hearts” (*magokoro*) which distinguished them from all other persons, though almost always only Chinese persons are specifically mentioned. The nativists asserted that this *magokoro* genetically endowed persons in Japan with the capacity to behave morally and ethically without recourse to moral or ethical instruction. In other words, the *magokoro* made it possible for untutored individuals to conform naturally, spontaneously and automatically to socially constructive norms, and in a remarkably stratified status-oriented society, the *magokoro* provided the basis for the horizontal comradeship that lies at the very heart of collective identity.

**Construction of a heritage—spatial orientation**

These essentialist arguments regarding Japan’s distinctiveness were also arguments regarding the superiority of Japanese culture and persons to the cultures and persons of other regions, and these arguments posited a “Japan” both above and within an international order that included the other countries of Asia and had China either as its centre or as part of an axis with Japan. Early modern “Japan” was not, however, coequal territorially with today’s Japan, since neither Hokkaidō nor the Ryūkyū Islands were included within the geo-body of the Tokugawa state.11 Following the improvements in

11 “Geo-body” is Thongchai Winichakul’s felicitous term in *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation* (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaii Press, 1994). This was true not just at the start of the Tokugawa period but throughout its first two centuries, as
block printing techniques of the early-seventeenth century, printed maps of this “Japan” began to circulate widely, contributing to an increasingly widely-shared spatial knowledge and conceptual understanding of the geo-body of Japan.

What emerges from this cartography is a spatial orientation that represented Japan at the center of a series of concentric peripheries. Prior to the Tokugawa, Japan was itself part of the periphery of China or Chûgoku (the Central Realm). Though Japan at that time was not a “vassal” kingdom along the lines of the Ryûkyû Islands or Korea, it was still a geo-body that understood its identity and its place among other geo-bodies in terms that were always expressed in reference to China. For this reason, it was characteristic of pre-nineteenth-century Japanese self-representations to characterize Japan as small and young, both of which were accurate only relative to China.

With the arrival of Portuguese and other Europeans in Japan after the 1540s came their maps—many later made in Japan into the form of folding screens—which showed Japan as a marginal part of a heretofore largely unknown world. This world rapidly became an exoticized object of fascination for many across a number of social strata in late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth century Japan. With the prohibition of Christianity and the expulsion of foreign clergy in 1612-14, and with the series of proscriptions in the 1630s regarding any unauthorized association with Europeans, and with such anti-

represented in maps commissioned by the Bakufu dating from the Keichô (1596-1615), Shôhô (1644-48), Genroku (1699-1704) and Kyôhô (1716-36) eras. One observes it as well in both Nagakubo Sekisui’s (1717-1801) Ōn to rotei zensu map of 1775, the earliest known Japanese longitudinal map, and the 214 sheets of Inô Tadataka’s (1745-1818) superb posthumously completed Dainihon enkai jissoku zensu map of 1821, which used European surveying techniques and was by far the most accurate map of Japan of its time. See Oda Takeo, Chizu no rekishi—Nihonben (Kôdansha 1974), pp. 69, 79, insert following p. 96, and 102-114.
Christian polemics as Fabian’s (b. 1565?) *Ha Daisu (Deus Destroyed)* of 1620,\textsuperscript{12} Christianity’s presence was ideologically erased from the official historical memory of early modern Japan, and this erasure likewise contributed to a spatial narrowing of Japan’s world.

Further, with this limiting of Japan’s multi-geo-bodied order to India, China, Korea, the Ryûkyû, Ezochi (Hokkaidô) and of course itself, Ch’ing China likewise soon came to become an increasingly metaphorical entity, suggestive of the middle-aged (as opposed to India’s elderly), the logical and rational, and even the somewhat sinister. China itself eventually lost its centrality in this new order, in which only Japan and at times the southern part of Korea mattered visually in the most common block printed maps of Tokugawa Japan.

Philosophically, Japan was represented as the new center, as in the celebrated military historian and Confucian scholar Yamaga Sokô’s (1622-85) *Chuchô jijitsu* (True Facts of the Central Realm) of 1665. In the work, Sokô argued many points, which later figured in both the nostalgic fantasies and speculations of such eighteenth-century nativists as Kamo no Mabuchi and Motoori Norinaga, as well as their twentieth-century counterpart Watsuji Tetsurô (1889-1960). The assertions they shared included (in the words of David Earl regarding Yamaga Sokô):

“the special influence of Japanese water and soil, creating a particular
Japanese spirit; the beauties of pure Shinto and the consequent necessity to
eradicate Buddhism; the unique characteristic of the Japanese state arising
from the unbroken imperial line; and the divine authority of emperor as

\textsuperscript{12} On which see George Elison’s *Deus Destroyed: The Image of Christianity in Early Modern Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1973).
ruler and educator of his people.”

It is precisely this identification of soil with race, and of polity with spirit that informed the collective identity—the racial patrimony—of early modern and later modern Japan, and this identity in turn had distinctive spatial dimensions to it.

One consequence of this inward turn is that the Ryûkyû Islands, which in the view of the Tokugawa state was a protectorate under the Shimazu family of Satsuma in Kyûshû, and Hokkaidô, which was likewise in its closest southwestern extremities under the nominal suzerainty of the Matsumae family, all but disappeared from the cartographic and pictorial representations of Japan. Korea was not far behind, as if Japanese superiority to Korea was simply assumed. This left it to cultural forms other than maps to define Japanese collective identity relative again now only either to itself or to a largely metaphorical China. In fact, even though Tokugawa Japan was never quite the hermetically sealed realm that the title of Donald Keene’s study of Tokugawa literature World Within Walls suggests, it was still a realm far more isolated than any of the realms of Europe at the same time.

Construction of Identity: Kokugaku (Nativism) and the place of China

All Confucians and Neo-Confucians in Japan recognized a measure of intellectual indebtedness to China. Some were overtly Sinophilic—none, it was said, more than

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Ogyū Sōrai (1666-1728), who seemed to admire little within his own tradition other than cherry blossoms and Mt. Fuji—but the leading Neo-Confucians all had robust interests in Japanese history and Japan’s heritage of kami worship. The interest in Japanese history was important because if the originally Chinese Confucian principles were truly universal, then one would expect to find them demonstrated in Japanese history no less than in Chinese. Japanese Confucian historians eventually took this argument of parity a step further by arguing, as Yamaga Sokō and then others did, that Japan’s past better represented core Confucian virtues like filial piety and loyalty than did China’s. The interest in kami worship and native spirituality generally stemmed from the assumption that if Confucian and Neo-Confucian principles are true, and if kami are likewise real, then these principles and these deities cannot be in conflict with one another.

Further, these same intellectuals saw their scholarship as representing portions—perhaps the most important portions but still only portions—of a world of scholarship that included a broad range of subjects, encompassing both things Chinese and things Japanese. In this sense, seventeenth-century Sinology and Japanology were simply components of a larger singular world of gakumon or scholarship, and thus, the study of Confucianism was able to coexist in an unproblematic manner with such seemingly remote subjects as the study of Japanese history or even Shinto theology.

This changed in the eighteenth century as certain scholars began to assert the study of things Japanese as a field of inquiry distinct from Chinese studies and in competition with it in the marketplace of ideas. This emergence of a new form of Japanese Studies is perhaps best understood as a gradual narrowing of Japanese studies in the broadest sense—including the study of Japanese literature, history, customs,
language, and religions (particularly Shinto)—to a more ideological and nativist form of Japanese studies that sought to articulate the essence of Japanese culture by looking at its earliest pre-Confucian and pre-Buddhist manifestations in poetry and myth, and by positing these in a binary relationship with Chinese culture. This movement came to be known as Kokugaku (National Learning or National Studies), and again, it was Kamo no Mabuchi who turned the broader field of Japanese studies into a narrower philological quest for the very roots of a freshly posited Japaneseness.

Mabuchi was enamored of poetry, which he believed represented a more transparent expression of what lay within the individual heart, and whose poetic rhythms he believed replicated the very rhythms of heaven and earth. He believed that within Japan’s most ancient extant verse, one could find expressions and in some cases echoes of a pre-Confucian pre-Buddhist arcadia, whose characteristics included august government and a robust polity rooted in such virtues as directness, straightforwardness and a masculine vigor, of which all were said to partake equally. This, he argued, was in fact the true ancient Way of Heaven and Earth, which had been lost in China owing to the deleterious effects of first Confucianism and then Buddhism. These moral and ethical doctrines, Mabuchi asserted, were originally intended to be a cure for the ills of an earlier age, but instead the antidote proved to be an ironic toxin, as individuals exposed to these doctrines now learned immorality along with morality and indulged in personal scheming.

The good news, according to Mabuchi, was that the original arcadia was recoverable in Japan through the medium of the Man’yōshū. This was so, he argued, because people now, as then, possess the previously discussed magokoro, or true hearts,
which enable them to live together successfully and relatively harmoniously without recourse to social, moral or ethical instruction of any kind. In this way, despite the fact that magokoro have been overwhelmed generation after generation by Confucian rationalism and Buddhist moralism, through the verses of the Man’yōshū the effects can be reversed, and persons in Japan can once again enjoy the same blessings as their archaic forebears.16

Though he only met Kamo no Mabuchi once, Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801) carried on Mabuchi’s teachings and is regarded by many as the greatest of the nativists. It was his lifelong project to decipher Japan’s oldest extant mytho-history, the Kojiki (712), which remains Norinaga’s greatest achievement. In his 1771 essay “The Rectifying Spirit” (Naobi no mitama) Norinaga used his analysis of the earliest myths to conclude that Japan’s ancient Way was of course not any Way to be found in ancient China, nor was it the natural Way of Heaven and Earth, as his mentor Mabuchi had argued, but rather it was the Way of the Kami or Shinto, a Way created neither by humans nor by natural principles but by the deities themselves.17 A lifelong Buddhist, Norinaga particularly objected to Chinese Confucianism’s effects on the Japanese Heart or Mind, but instead of proposing that these effects be overcome through the medium of ancient texts, Norinaga counseled reliance on the rectifying properties of native deities. Only then, he maintained, will one be able to reunite with the deities all around one and to resume one’s rightful place in a chain of authority that extends through one’s local lords to the divine tennō and ultimately as far as the solar deity and imperial ancestress Amaterasu herself.18

16 Nosco, Remembering Paradise, pp. 99-158
17 Nishimura, “Way of the Gods”, Monumenta Nipponica
18 Shigeru Matsumoto, Motoori Norinaga.
In the last decades of the Tokugawa period, the antagonism that characterized the relationship between nativism and Confucianism diminished, returning to the comfortable coexistence that prevailed prior to the eighteenth century. Particularly in Mito, where the domain had a tradition of sponsoring pro-imperial historical scholarship, many of the essentialist themes of Kokugaku were joined to Confucian notions of loyalty and filial piety. This in turn created a powerful emperor-centered essentialist ideology that proved inspirational to many of those who sought to rebuff the nineteenth-century threats from Europe and North America.

**Japan’s Early Modern Worldview—The Epistemological Dimension**

Japan’s first contact with Europeans in the sixteenth century was with those who sought either profit or Catholic converts, and often the two were linked. From the mid-sixteenth century on the Christian presence in Japan expanded rapidly, though always precariously, and at the start of the Tokugawa period and for its first decade there were some 300,000 Christians in Japan, representing just over 1% of the population, with significant concentrations in Kyushu, and all major cities. Even those with little or no spiritual interest in the creed were often attracted to its exotic trappings, such as crosses, rosaries and other material trappings of the faith.

During the 1620s and 1630s when Christianity was ruthlessly suppressed and the European presence in Japan contracted to the Dutch East India Company factory on the artificial islet of Deshima in Nagasaki Harbor, the West as represented by Europe receded from the popular imagination. For nearly a century even non-Christian knowledge of
Europe was forbidden and any discussion of it excluded from the public sphere for nearly a century. Knowledge of China was similarly transformed as China began to operate less as a reality during the Tokugawa period—its subjugation by the alien Manchu and their establishment of the Ch’ing dynasty from 1644 having substantially diminished the allure of the Chinese model—and increasingly metaphorically as a symbol of all that was big, grand, rational, dignified, mature, crafty and so on.\(^{19}\)

After reaching a peak during the 1650s and 1660s (recall the persecution of Yamaga Sokô for daring to offer an alternative interpretation of Confucianism in 1665), the exaggerated concern with Christianity specifically and Europe generally receded so that by the 1720s during the more enlightened regime of the Shogun Tokugawa Yoshimune it was possible to enact long-overdue calendrical reform, and to relax the proscription on European books, so long as they omitted reference to Christianity. As for the Christians, for nearly a hundred years from the late-seventeenth to the late-eighteenth centuries, no one in Japan lost her or his life for reasons of personal faith.

Further, with the relaxation of the ban on European books, it became possible to engage in a new field of learning called Rangaku, short for Oranda-gaku, or Dutch (Holland) Learning or Studies. Though never popular in the way that Confucian or nativist studies became popular, this Dutch or Western Learning meant that limited knowledge of European science and mathematics continued to enter the country. Typically, however, this knowledge was pursued not out of some sympathetic predisposition or favor towards Europe but rather so as to obtain vital intelligence about a potential rival.\(^{20}\) For example, Honda Toshiaki (1744-1821), a leading proponent of this

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\(^{19}\) Donald Keene, “Characteristic Responses to Confucianism in Tokugawa Literature” in Nosco (ed.), *Confucianism and Tokugawa Culture*.

\(^{20}\) Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, *Anti-Foreignism and Western Learning in Early-Modern*
new field, proposed adopting a Western alphabet, expanding Japanese interests to Saghalien and Kamchatka, and moving Japan’s capital to the latter since it would then lie at 51° N. Lat., the same as London, and all this not owing to some admiration of things European, but rather as strategies to strengthen Japan’s position vis a vis an external threat.  

Despite the suspicion with which Europe was viewed, Western knowledge contributed to a major shift in attitude in Japan toward China, the West and even Japan itself. One dramatic example occurred in 1771 when the Rangaku scholar Sugita Genpaku (1733-1817) witnessed the dissection of a female criminal. Sugita compared what he saw with the anatomical diagrams in a Dutch translation of the German work *Anatomische Tabellen* (1722) by Johann Adam Kulmus. He found that this European work represented human anatomy more accurately than the traditional texts of Chinese medicine, which in turn implied not only that Chinese knowledge might be mistaken and even at least occasionally inferior to European knowledge, but also that Japanese and Europeans might be fundamentally the same on the inside, despite their external differences. Sugita’s 1774 translation of the *Anatomische Tabellen* into Japanese made his discoveries more accessible and stimulated the interest of others in learning Dutch and the knowledge that it unlocked.

This exotic Dutch knowledge proved urgently relevant from the 1850s on when the European and now American incursions proved uncontrollable. This in part explains the interest of a brilliant youngster like Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901) to go to Nagasaki in 1854 to study Western gunnery, and then the next year to Osaka for advanced Rangaku

*Japan: The New Theses of 1825.*  
21 Donald Keene, *The Japanese Discovery of Europe, 1720-1830.*  
22 Maraius Jansen, *Japan and Its World: Two Centuries of Change.*
before being invited to Edo in 1858 to open his own school of Dutch. As he and other Rangaku authorities learned more about this new world, they discovered to their dismay that Dutch was not the Western lingua franca they had hoped, and so Fukuzawa immersed himself in the study of English prior to joining the first official Japanese mission to the United States as its interpreter in 1860. For Japan and many Japanese a complex world was about to become immeasurably more so.

**Conclusion—Anticipating Modernity**

When European and North American scholars first studied the Tokugawa period, it was from the perspective that Tokugawa culture supported a feudal state that had to be overcome for Japan to attain modernity, but as these same scholars awakened to the rich diversity of Tokugawa culture and became more appreciative of intellectual change during those years, the period increasingly appeared to have many of the features of modernity. This reappraisal, in turn, prompted a concern with locating a genesis for Japan’s modernity, and an effort to situate that genesis on a global scale of modernity(ies).

The political theorist, sociologist and public intellectual Maruyama Masao (d. 1997) saw the roots of Japan’s modern consciousness in Ogyû Sorai’s effort to take the Way out of nature, where Chinese Confucian historiography had traditionally located it, and to place it in history, or as Maruyama expressed it, to see an ontological shift from nature (*shizen*) to invention (*sakui*). According to Maruyama, the traditional Chinese Confucian belief that the Way was ontologically linked to Heaven and thus nature meant
that the assumptions and premises of that Way must necessarily be valid universally. However, by this same logic, once the Way was historicized by seeing it as a human invention or construction, as Ogyū Sorai did, then the state itself was likewise historicized, disclosing its contingent properties and its relentless need to respond to change. Though one can discern traces of this momentous shift in earlier writings, this transition from a naturalist to a historicist ontology was particularly prominent in the mid-to-late eighteenth century, and Maruyama saw an analog to this in the Kokugaku shift from Kamo no Mabuchi’s natural Way of Heaven and Earth to Motoori Norinaga’s Way of the Gods. Indeed, despite his contempt for Chinese modes of thought, Kamo no Mabuchi had nothing but admiration for ancient Daoists who similarly located an ancient Way in nature, and who condemned Confucian rationalism as a dangerous fallacy. By contrast, Norinaga rejected all ancient Chinese thought including that of the Daoists, extolling instead a native Way created (read “invented”) by native deities, i.e., a distinctively Japanese Way that operates in nature but is not of nature.

This represented a transition with a host of implications. For example, when one regards the Way as part of nature, then those canonical texts that are believed to encode the Way necessarily have didactic value, whether in China or Japan, since reading them should literally help to make one a better person. But once one separated the Way from nature and located it in the world of history, then it remained the case that even though one can learn from ancient texts, one could no longer rely on the possibility of being transformed by them. In other words, once those literary or poetic classics that had traditionally been regarded as foundational were separated from moral significance, one was then free to evaluate these and other works of literature not in terms of their value for
teaching moral lessons, but rather for their capacity to amuse or entertain.

This historicized understanding of the Way, according to Maruyama, found its greatest following during the decades following Sorai’s death in 1736, and if we take into consideration the coincidence of Norinaga’s “Rectifying Spirit” and Sugita Genpaku’s autopsy (both in 1771), we see that the Japanese world of ideas as a whole was experiencing a number of dramatic transitions. At every turn one discerns the mixed blessing of liberation from traditional patterns along with the emergence of a host of new binaries, such as foreign rationalism juxtaposed against a nativist appreciation of the wondrous; and a freshly constructed Japan juxtaposed against an increasingly metaphoric China. The traditional world view in Japan, which as we have seen placed China either at its centre, or as a polarity on a China-Japan axis, was now discredited, though the new world view which arose to take its place would itself not survive for long. In various ways, a more pluralistic set of options was about to become available within the marketplace of ideas in Japan, and these options included world views. The perspectives from which persons in Japan interpret both the world and their own world were about to become immeasurably more diverse and dynamic, and the place of China would get carried along in ways that have continued with mixed consequences into the present.